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Accountability and transparency in English local government: Moving 
from “matching parts” to “awkward couple”? 
 
Abstract 
 
Although excessive transparency and accountability demands can have a counterproductive 
effect on organisational performance (Bovens 2005), longstanding hierarchical accountability 
structures to ensure financial conformance in English local government continue to endure. 
Interestingly however, the previously top-down regime for performance accountability in 
English local government has been replaced by bottom-up mechanisms such as greater 
transparency and a more open market for public services. Using the framework developed by 
Hood (2010), this paper will show how such reforms mean that transparency and 
accountability are moving from being “matching parts” to an “awkward couple”, and how 
this has significant implications for public services.  
 
Keywords: accountability, transparency, English local government, budgeting, performance 
measurement  
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Accountability and transparency in English local government: Moving 
from “matching parts” to “awkward couple”? 
 
Introduction 
 
Budgeting and governing in the UK public sector can be viewed as constituting three acts 
(Ferry and Eckersley 2011; 2012). In this view, Act 1 is the spending review that sets out a 
framework for income and expenditure levels over the medium term and Act 2 is the annual 
budget that enables detailed policy choices with associated financial impacts and 
implications. The accountability and transparency arrangements that afford confidence in the 
accounting and internal management practices (Hood 2010; Ball 2012) could be perceived as 
constituting Act 3i. There is some disagreement over how extensive and independent these 
arrangements are (or should be) in practice (Heald 2012), as well as how much information 
should be disclosed to the public (Radcliffe 2008; 2011; Funnell 2011). However, it is 
generally accepted that auditors perform a crucial role at this point – not only in the UK, but 
also in other jurisdictions – because they provide citizens and their representatives with an 
assessment of whether policies are having their desired effect and thereby help to hold 
government to account (Bovens 2005). Indeed, it is generally recognised that a balance 
between financial conformance and operational performance is essential in public sector 
governance (IFAC 2011, 2013; CIPFA 2010a, 2010b) – meaning that service outcomes need 
to be assessed alongside a financial audit.  
 
This paper analyses how the UK Central Government has changed the accountability and 
transparency arrangements for local government in Englandii, and thereby revised the script 
for Act 3. Most notably, the Government has abolished the Audit Commission, a non-
  4
departmental body that used to audit English municipalities and oversee a complex system of 
top-down performance assessment for local government. The Audit Commission’s financial 
auditing responsibilities have been transferred to the National Audit Office (which used to 
focus solely on central government departments), and the local government performance 
framework has been replaced by requirements for municipalities to publish a range of 
datasets online for public scrutiny (Eckersley et al 2013).iii Specifically, the article considers 
the impact of these reforms using a conceptual approach based on the supposed “Siamese 
twins” of accountability and transparency (Hood 2010). In this context, it illustrates how 
hierarchical performance accountability arrangements have been replaced by a bottom-up 
approach that relies on data transparency and open competition. As a result, accountability 
structures for municipalities’ operational performance (the mechanisms that assess whether 
they deliver services to a high standard) have been broadened beyond accountants and the 
audit profession. Meanwhile, top-down monitoring of financial conformance (ensuring that 
spending remains within agreed budgets) has persisted, with Audit Commission 
responsibilities in this regard transferring to the National Audit Office. Although the article 
focuses on English municipalities, its findings are equally relevant for other countries 
because robust accountability procedures are recognised as good practice around the world. 
 
As O’Neill (2006) argues, transparency only requires the dissemination of data, which means 
it does not need to be comprehensible to the reader – and there may be no control over its 
quality. As such, the nature of the data that are published influences how effectively an agent 
can be held to account, as well as the skills and other resources of whoever seeks to analyse 
the information. This article applies her analysis to the field of English local government 
performance and argues that accountability and transparency are becoming an “awkward 
couple” since they do not necessarily combine to produce good governance (Hood 2010). 
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Indeed, the transparency requirements that now apply to English municipalities could actually 
diminish accountability because the reforms have significant implications for what is visible 
and to whom (Hopwood 1984).  
 
The next section of this paper discusses the literature on accountability and transparency. It 
culminates in Hood’s (2010) characterisation of the relationship between these two concepts 
and how different worldviews can enable us to interpret the association in various ways. 
Hood’s framework is then applied to the arrangements for monitoring operational 
performance and financial conformance in English local government since 1997, before the 
arguments are summed up in the conclusion.  
 
The article draws on government publications such as the Open Public Services white paper 
(Cabinet Office 2011), Spending Reviews (HM Treasury 2007; 2010b), the Budget (HM 
Treasury 2010a) and the Localism Act (HM Government, 2011), as well as ministerial 
announcements. In this way, it identifies how various reforms will influence the relationship 
between accountability and transparency in local public services and shape the future 
scenario. English local government is often cited as a forerunner in New Public Management 
(NPM) practices, since it has been subjected to a range of NPM-inspired reforms such as 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering, Best Value and other performance frameworks in recent 
decades (Andrews and van de Walle 2013). As a result, it provides a particularly relevant 
example for other jurisdictions that might be considering changing their performance 
management arrangements. 
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Accountability defined 
 
Traditionally, accountability has been associated with calling an individual ‘to account’ for 
their actions to some higher authority, with an emphasis on external scrutiny and the threat of 
potential sanctions (Jones 1992). Although its meaning has since been extended in a number 
of different directions (which led Sinclair (1995) to describe it as having the qualities of a 
chameleon), most scholars agree on the importance of a two-way relationship between the 
‘agent’ and the ‘principal’, whereby the agent is accountable to the principal for its actions 
(Mayston 1993; Mulgan 2000). The identity of the principal influences the direction in which 
accountability is exercised: it may be upwards (to a higher authority), downwards (to citizens 
or a community), or sideways (as part of a contract that has been agreed for mutual benefit). 
Sinclair’s (1995, p.222) definition of “public accountability as a more direct answerability to 
the community” suggests that the ‘principal’ corresponds to the general public. However, in 
order to ensure that experts in the field can analyse the relevant data and make an informed 
judgement, accountability may first need to ‘travel’ upwards to Parliament or another 
authority, before returning downwards to citizens. We will return to these ideas later in our 
analysis of how developments in the accountability procedures for English local government 
apply to Hood’s framework. 
 
As mentioned earlier, accountability is often seen as a pre-requisite for good governance. 
Bovens (2005) lists five reasons for public accountability mechanisms, including the need to 
ensure democratic control of public institutions, to prevent corruption and abuse of power and 
to improve public confidence in governance arrangements. However, although there is little 
doubt that these are worthwhile objectives, Bovens is equally clear that “more” controls are 
neither necessarily desirable nor lead to exponentially better governance, as excessive 
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monitoring and rules can hinder decision-making and have a negative impact on operational 
performance. In other words, the costs of operating accountability procedures and systems 
may outweigh the potential benefits that they might deliver, and accountability should not be 
pursued for its own sake (Mayston 1993; De Fine Licht et al. 2014). Some critics take this 
idea further by clarifying the intended means and ends of accountability when it is applied to 
inputs, processes and outcomes. For example, focusing particularly on what they classify as 
the intended means of ‘performance’, which aims to translate into an end of ‘justice’ or 
‘equity’, they find that there is little evidence to suggest that accountability protocols have 
delivered their objectives (Dubnick and Frederickson 2010, p.1145).  
 
In a Weberian system of public administration, hierarchical management structures help 
senior decision-makers to control service delivery through bureaucratic systems (Bovens 
2005), which justifies the traditional doctrine of holding ministers to account for policy and 
performance. However, NPM reforms, particularly the ‘agencification’, privatisation and 
outsourcing of a significant proportion of government functions to alternative providers, have 
transformed many of these structures. They have also challenged the traditional notion of 
ministerial accountability, due to the notional separation of policy-making and delivery (or 
‘purchaser’ and ‘provider’), and allowed ministers to divest themselves of responsibility for 
poor administrative performance, whilst theoretically remaining accountable to Parliament 
for overall policy (Mulgan 2002). Indeed, Bovens (2005) highlights how NPM reforms have 
led some to argue that accountability is exercised increasingly ‘horizontally’ through 
contractual relationships with suppliers. 
 
In parallel with NPM reforms, it has been argued that UK politicians in central government 
have orchestrated a shift towards casting public service consumers as the principal (Mayston 
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1993, 86). This approach seems to fit with the dominant British view that the purpose of local 
government is overwhelmingly as a service provider, rather than the more democratic 
perspective (which is common elsewhere in Europe) that views municipalities as central to 
the system through which communities govern themselves and make political decisions for 
the benefit of everyone in the locality (Batley 1991). However, Mayston (1993) finds that 
genuine “consumer sovereignty” remains some distance away, and warns that the reforms 
have left a legacy of imperfect monitoring and financial reporting (see also Shaoul et al 
2012). Indeed, there is an extensive literature on how outsourcing, privatisation and public 
private partnerships have reduced the accountability of public services, partly due to the 
complexity of supplier contracts (Pollitt, 1986; Shaoul 1997; Funnell 2000; Letza and 
Smallman 2001; Broadbent et al., 2003; Froud, 2003; Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008; English 
and Baxter, 2010). As some critics have pointed out, “the strength of agency accountability to 
programme goals is in reverse ratio to the distances actual implementation travels and the 
layers of third parties through which implementation travels” (Dubnick and Frederickson 
2010, p. 1151).  
 
The above discussion focuses overwhelmingly on public accountability structures and 
processes that have been introduced and exercised from the top down. However, given its 
perceived nature as a pre-requisite of democracy and good governance, it is worth 
investigating whether accountability is too important to be left to accountants and auditors 
and might (also) be exercised from the bottom up. Keeping with this, it has been suggested 
that increased transparency of government bodies, alongside a move to ‘open up’ public 
services to competition, could enable citizens and alternative providers to hold them to 
account. In particular, the publication of government data online through the UK 
Government’s ‘transparency’ agenda has been heralded as a way of enabling “armchair 
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auditors” to exercise more comprehensive democratic oversight of public spending (Pickles 
2011) and hold public bodies to account from the bottom up. Transparency is therefore 
becoming further entwined with developments of disclosure and audit (Power 1999). 
 
Transparency defined 
 
Transparency refers to “the conduct of business in a fashion that makes decisions, rules and 
other information visible from outside” (Hood 2010, p. 989). Taking a historical perspective, 
Hood (2006) traced how transparency became an increasingly prevalent concept in 
discussions of organisation and governance, even if the word was not always used explicitly. 
For example, over recent decades a growing number of Western democracies have introduced 
Freedom of Information legislation in the name of enhancing democracy, and it is notable 
that several government and parliamentary buildings have incorporated transparency into 
their very design, as a way of illustrating that the activities of their occupants should be 
visible to the public (Heald 2006a).  
 
One perspective holds that transparency is a “human right”, as it can help to protect against 
inefficient or oppressive government (Birkinshaw 2006). However, Heald (2006b) argues that 
we should not ascribe any intrinsic value to the idea of transparency in government. Instead, 
it should be valued instrumentally, because in particular contexts it is a “building block” for 
other aspects of public policy that it may support or compete with – including accountability.  
 
Nonetheless, as O’Neill (2006) points out, transparency does not necessarily improve 
accountability, since it can result in organisations taking a box-ticking approach to publishing 
a huge volume of raw data rather than meaningful information. If these data are not put into 
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their appropriate context, or cannot be understood by their audience (the ‘principal’) very 
easily, they are worthless – and the ‘agent’ may be even less accountable than at the outset. 
Furthermore, as Prat (2005) suggests, the ‘wrong kind’ of transparency – that which concerns 
activities rather than consequences - can cause problems because the agent has an incentive to 
portray their behaviour as being somehow ‘normal’. As a result, they may withhold or 
disregard some useful private information (thus misleading the principal), or simply try to 
conform to expectations (and therefore not attempt to innovate and improve). In this way, the 
quality and type of data that is made available determines whether it can be used effectively 
for accountability purposes. 
 
Indeed, various scholars have argued that the way transparency mechanisms are structured 
shapes their impact on public policy in terms of effectiveness, equity and democratic 
accountability. In particular, Heald (2012) suggests that the core notion of transparency about 
public expenditure is in making underlying realities visible and intelligible to identified user 
communities. It is not enough to simply produce and distribute data, as transparency needs an 
audience with the capacity to understand the data and act upon it as information. For 
example, public expenditure needs to be communicated intelligibly to those external to the 
organisation (potentially in a manner similar to listed public companies, where significant 
private resources are dedicated through accounting standards development, organisation 
financial reporting and auditing by independent auditors). 
 
In the context of public expenditure, Heald (2012) suggests transparency has five attributes. 
First, it is found in disciplined information release, without which manipulative practices of 
plants, leaks and spin could undermine it. Second, so that users can drill down to relevant 
organisational detail from a ‘synoptic’ perspective (Eckersley et al, 2013), it needs to be 
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comprehensive and founded upon a well designed hierarchy of reporting documents. Third, 
capacity issues and structuring political incentives need to be closely linked. Fourth, it is 
important to have an independent scrutiny capacity outside the legislature. Fifth, the role of 
public audit is vital to effective transparency, both to validate financial reporting (as per 
private sector audit) and in its wider remit of regularity (expenditure accords with 
authorisation), propriety (absence of fraud and corruption) and performance (the achievement 
of value for money).  
 
The accountability-transparency relationship  
 
This discussion brings us to Hood’s (2010) characterisation of the relationship between 
accountability and transparency and how it is widely assumed that both transparency and 
accountability are necessary to ensure good governance, with the former often a pre-requisite 
of the latter.  
 
His paper articulates three characterisations of the relationship between these two concepts, 
and then sets out a framework for understanding which description might fit best. The three 
characterisations are: 
1. ‘Siamese twins’ – accountability and transparency are not really distinguishable from 
one another. The tendency for both terms to be used together suggests that this is a 
widely-held interpretation  
2. ‘Matching parts’ – accountability and transparency are separable, but nevertheless 
complement one another and are both necessary for good governance. For example, 
governments should disclose some information to the public in order to be held 
democratically accountable 
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3. ‘Awkward couple’ – accountability and transparency do not necessarily work together 
and there may be some tension between the two. This view argues that transparency 
does not necessarily improve accountability or governance, since it leads to the agent 
publishing reams of poor-quality information that the principal cannot access or 
analyse easily (see O’Neill 2006 for a full discussion). 
 
Hood (2010) also drew on the cultural theory of Douglas (1966; 1970; 1992) and Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1982) to outline four competing ‘worldviews’ (hierarchy, equality, 
individualism and fatalism) of how conduct is socially regulated. These perspectives, which 
explain how it is possible to perceive the accountability-transparency relationship in various 
ways, are summarised in Figure 1 and outlined below. 
 
Worldview Direction of 
accountability 
Transparency regime Characterisation 
 
Hierarchist Upwards, to 
authority 
Access to public and private 
information on a ‘need to 
know’ basis 
Matching parts, but 
potentially awkward 
couple 
Egalitarian Downwards, to 
communities 
Presumption of general 
openness and disclosure of 
public and private 
information 
Siamese twins 
Individualist Horizontally, 
between contracting 
parties 
Personal privacy and 
commercial confidentiality is 
paramount 
Matching parts, but 
potentially awkward 
couple 
Fatalist Unpredictable, to 
whoever can 
demand it 
Random access depending 
on coincidences and 
unpredictable events  
Any of the three 
Figure 1: The nature of accountability and transparency within different worldviews 
(adapted from Hood 2010) 
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 A hierarchist perspective assumes an established ‘pecking order’ and accountability is 
largely exercised “upwards”, towards authority figures. Transparency is probably seen 
as an instrumental value and therefore a “matching part” for accountability, although 
publishing some types of information might result in them being an “awkward 
couple”. This view correlates with traditional Weberian administrative systems, 
particularly prior to initiatives such as freedom of information. 
 An egalitarian worldview interprets accountability as being owed to the people or 
community (‘downwards’) and therefore does not restrict access to information. There 
is a presumption of openness and disclosure, about both public and private affairs, 
perhaps on the basis that transparency is a human right rather than necessarily a tool 
for achieving other objectives. As such, the “Siamese twins” interpretation, whereby 
transparency and accountability are inseparable from one another, fits most closely. 
 An individualist perspective holds that individual needs should prevail over those of 
the group, and is therefore less concerned with state activities. Indeed, it is likely to 
argue for citizens to be able to choose alternative providers of public services and 
thereby exercise accountability horizontally, through contractual relationships. 
However, transparency can be restricted if it undermines privacy or commercial 
confidentiality. In most cases the “matching parts” interpretation is most fitting, but in 
the event of information published being unfit for purpose, the “awkward couple” 
analogy could also apply. 
 A fatalist viewpoint stresses that actions have unintended consequences and it is 
therefore impossible to make a link between accountability and transparency. As a 
result, any of the three characterisations might apply in any given situation, but the 
randomness of human interactions means we cannot predict which type of 
relationship is likely to develop. 
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The above characterisation of accountability and transparency is now considered in the 
context of arrangements for monitoring financial conformance and operational performance 
in English local government since 1997.  
 
Accountability and transparency in English local government 
 
The UK New Labour Government that was elected in 1997 extended the framework of top-
down arrangements aimed at improving the accountability of local government in England. In 
terms of financial conformance, Comprehensive Spending Reviews were conducted to 
provide multi-year frameworks for public expenditure between 1998 and 2010. These 
frameworks stipulated the overall level of central grants that would be distributed to English 
local government during the period, with individual municipality allocations decided on an 
annual basis (HM Treasury 2007). In addition, the Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government retained (and, on occasions, exercised) the right to ‘cap’ individual levels 
of Council Tax, which represented the main source of finance over which municipalities had 
some autonomy – even if it only accounted for around one-quarter of their revenue. Finally, 
towards the end of the 2000s, the Treasury required all public sector organisations, including 
municipalities, to adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Since these 
standards were developed for private sector companies, who need to report solely to 
shareholders rather than wider stakeholders (Shaoul et al 2012), this shift highlights that local 
government was accountable ‘upwards’ to central government for its financial conformance, 
rather than ‘downwards’ to citizens.  
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Taking all of these factors together, there was an undeniably hierarchical approach to 
monitoring local government financial conformance during this period. Since budgetary 
reporting systems were designed to complement the hierarchical process, and auditors were 
provided with relevant data that was fit for purpose, we can also use the matching parts 
analogy to describe the relationship between accountability and transparencyiv.  
 
In parallel with these developments in budgetary procedures, the government also added to 
the existing hierarchical arrangements for performance accountability. In particular, it 
introduced public service agreements (PSAs) that linked funding to central government 
department outputs and outcomes. These PSAs operated alongside (though did not 
necessarily complement) the existing Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) 
requirement for departments to report on the impact of their spending through an output and 
performance analysis. PSAs were supposed to cascade down from central government 
departments to their relevant ‘delivery’ organisations in the form of specific objectives that 
would contribute to the overall aims of the parent department. For example, English 
municipalities were asked to report on their progress against a range of indicators that 
(theoretically at least) monitored how well they were delivering outcomes on behalf of 
central government. The Audit Commission then reported through its performance 
management frameworks on the extent to which each municipality’s spending decisions 
delivered desired outputs and outcomes, which was initially through its Best Value regime, 
and subsequently as part of its Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) and then 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA). CPA gave each municipality a ‘star’ rating 
according to how well it appeared to be performing against the targets. In 2009 CPA was 
replaced by CAA, which monitored how well public bodies were delivering outcomes in the 
local area. These outcomes were agreed by local public sector organisations, but had to be 
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approved by central government through its regional offices. Therefore, since municipalities 
reported ‘upwards’ to a centralised target regime, and bodies such as the Audit Commission 
could access relevant information on a ‘need to know’ basis, we can see how the 
Government’s arrangements for monitoring operational performance centrally also 
corresponded with the hierarchist interpretation of accountabilityv. In addition, since auditors 
could process and analyse this data, and produced reports that enabled elected officials and 
citizens to hold municipalities to account, we can see how the ‘matching parts’ analogy 
applies. 
 
Since taking office in 2010, the Coalition Government (consisting of Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats) has retained many aspects of the centralised system for ensuring financial 
conformance. These include multi-year spending reviews (although they are no longer 
described as being “comprehensive” and the current spending period has been truncated by 
the general election of 2015), the annual local government grant settlement, financial audits 
and adherence to IFRS. Although some changes to these arrangements have been introduced, 
which may at face value suggest that the hierarchical approach to financial conformance is 
weakening, in fact it will persist. For example, in tune with its rhetoric of ‘localism’, the new 
government removed the ‘ring-fences’ from many of its grant funding streams to 
municipalities, ostensibly to give them greater freedom to decide how to allocate their 
resources. In reality, because the overall level of funding to local government is set to fall by 
26% over the four-year spending review period (HM Treasury 2010b), municipalities will 
have far less ability to spend money on local priorities. Similarly, the power to ‘cap’ rises in 
Council Tax has been replaced by a new requirement for municipalities to organise local 
referenda to approve any increase that the Secretary of State deems is “excessive”. In fact, 
since no municipality would expect to win such a referendum, they are extremely unlikely to 
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risk having to organise one, and therefore essentially remain accountable ‘upwards’ to central 
government through a cap in all but name. Finally, although the Coalition has abolished the 
Audit Commission, it has transferred the task of overseeing municipality financial audits to 
the National Audit Office, and thereby maintained its control over local government 
expenditure. As such, the hierarchical approach and matching parts analogy will continue, in 
spite of these reforms to financial conformance mechanisms. This is because central 
government has maintained its control over local expenditure through a hierarchical system 
of funding settlements, IFRS, annual audits and Council Tax compliance. Together with the 
reduction in grant income, these mechanisms will mean that municipalities remain 
accountable ‘upwards’ to central government for their financial management, rather than 
‘downwards’ to residents. 
 
As we outlined earlier, “too much” accountability can have a negative effect on service 
outcomes, because excessive rules constrain officials and hinder decision-making (Mayston 
1993; Bovens 2005). In keeping with this line of argument, the Coalition Government has 
abolished many of the hierarchical performance accountability mechanisms for local 
government, including the Audit Commission and CAA (the National Audit Office has only 
assumed responsibility for auditing municipal finances). Extolling the virtues of cutting ‘red 
tape’, ministers claimed to remove around 4,700 central targets so that municipalities “will be 
free to focus on protecting frontline services” (Department for Communities and Local 
Government 2010b).   
 
In accordance with its rhetoric of ‘localism’ and the ‘Big Society’, the Government has 
replaced this architecture by a system of bottom-up accountability measures. Most notably, 
its drive for increasing the ‘transparency’ of public administration, which builds on the 
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Freedom of Information Act 2000 and previous ‘open government’ initiatives, has resulted in 
the publication of vast amounts of data relating to public bodies. Ministers have stressed the 
importance of giving private citizens, or “armchair auditors”, access to information about 
how their taxes are being spent through this transparency agenda. For example, English 
municipalities are now required to publish details of all transactions worth over £500, as well 
as the salaries of senior staff and some performance information (Department for 
Communities and Local Government 2010a).  
 
Although ministerial announcements still suggest that transparency is a tool to improve 
organisational efficiency rather than a human right (see for example Pickles 2011), these 
developments nonetheless suggest a shift towards an egalitarian worldview, in which 
accountability is exercised ‘downwards’ from public bodies to citizens. As we shall see 
however, the transparency agenda sits alongside other policy initiatives that aim to increase 
the share of public services delivered by private and voluntary providers. These ideas actually 
fit more closely with the individualist perspective, since they will reduce the role of the state 
and will result in accountability being exercised increasingly horizontally through contractual 
relationships. Most importantly, the ‘right to challenge’ that features in the 2011 Localism 
Act will allow alternative suppliers to challenge a municipality on the basis that they could 
provide services better or cheaper than the incumbent provider (HM Government 2011). The 
data that are published through the transparency agenda will help private and voluntary sector 
organisations produce informed challenges to incumbent suppliers and ultimately assume 
responsibility for delivering a greater share of public services (Eckersley et al 2013). In a 
similar vein, the Open Public Services white paper (Cabinet Office 2011) sets out how users 
should be able to choose to access public services from various providers and thereby hold 
them to account through market mechanisms. As such, these initiatives appear to improve the 
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transparency and accountability of public bodies, because they are providing the ‘principal’ 
(the service user) with undiluted information about the activities of their ‘agent’ (the service 
provider).  
 
Whether by accident or design, we can see how this new system of performance 
accountability is actually closer to the individualist (rather than egalitarian) worldview, since 
it is exercised horizontally through contractual arrangements and consumer choicevi.  Hood 
(2010) argues that such a perspective normally results in a ‘matching parts’ interpretation of 
the relationship between accountability and transparency, but cautions that a “mismatch” 
could result in them becoming an awkward couple. Analysis of the Coalition Government’s 
initiatives outlined above shows that the nature of the information that becomes available is 
likely to cause such a mismatch. This is because citizens are now being invited to assess 
organisational performance on the basis of gigabytes of raw data, without assistance from 
professional auditors. In keeping with O’Neill (2006), these datasets will be inaccessible and 
meaningless to most members of the public, who are not experts in public management or 
audit and will lack relevant contextual information. Instead, large private sector suppliers will 
be the major beneficiaries, because they will possess the resources to analyse this data, and 
also have an incentive to do so – namely to inform a challenge to the incumbent provider 
(Eckersley et al 2013). As Funnell (2000) has identified, outsourced or privatised public 
services are often neither transparent nor publicly accountable, because suppliers are reluctant 
to make information public on the grounds of commercial confidentiality and there is an 
absence of democratic oversight.  
 
Moreover, Skelcher (2005) highlights that contractors possess more knowledge about the 
nature of the work they have undertaken compared to their clients, and this “information 
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asymmetry” could mean that supposedly transparent public services actually become 
increasingly opaque. In this situation it becomes questionable whether accountability could 
even be exercised horizontally by competing suppliers. As such, we can see how 
accountability and transparency form an awkward couple in the new system of performance 
monitoring (see Figure 2).  
 
 Financial conformance Operational performance 
Worldview Characterisation Worldview Characterisation 
1997-2010 Hierarchist Matching parts Hierarchist Matching parts 
2010- Hierarchist Matching parts Individualist Awkward couple 
 
Figure 2: Characterisations of financial conformance and operational performance in 
English local government since 1997 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has used the conceptual framework developed by Hood (2010) to illustrate the 
changing nature of accountability and transparency in English local government, focusing on 
the post-1997 era. It has highlighted how top-down structures to ensure financial 
conformance have endured throughout this period, in spite of the fact that substantial 
demands for transparency and accountability can have a potentially deleterious impact on 
organisational performance. These structures correspond to a “matching parts” 
characterisation of the relationship between accountability and transparency. In contrast 
however, since taking office in 2010 the Coalition Government has abolished the top-down 
approach to monitoring local government outputs and outcomes. This regime has been 
replaced by data transparency and a more open market in public services, which ostensibly 
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allows users to exercise accountability from the bottom up by choosing from a range of 
providers.  
 
The transparency agenda suggests that an egalitarian perspective may be most applicable to 
this new scenario, because accountability is supposedly being exercised ‘downwards’ and 
there is a presumption that information should be disclosed. However, complementary 
initiatives aimed at increasing the share of public services that are delivered by private 
companies and voluntary organisations mean that the situation actually relates most closely to 
the individualist interpretation. In addition, since the supposed principals (private citizens) 
will not have the necessary skills and experience to interpret and analyse the raw data that 
municipalities are required to publish, there will be a mismatch between transparency and 
accountability and these two concepts will be cast in an “awkward couple” relationship. 
 
These developments, together with the fact that formal performance assessments of local 
government have been abolished, mean that hierarchical accountability will be much more 
focused on managing spend (financial conformance) rather than on what has been achieved 
for such spend (operational performance). Furthermore, the hierarchical accountability 
structures for financial conformance are likely to be much more influential than the 
horizontal mechanisms that ostensibly aim to monitor operational performance. This is not 
only due to the fact that the centralised system for financial control remains very 
comprehensive, with ministers exerting significant control over local government finance 
(particularly in an era of austerity), but also because the “transparency” reforms will actually 
lead to citizens having a more opaque picture of local government performance than was the 
case previously. As a result, public bodies will concentrate much more on financial 
stewardship than improving the effectiveness of their services. In this way, transparency 
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initiatives will actually reduce the accountability of English local government rather than 
increase it – something that has significant implications for citizens and users of public 
services. Similarly, other jurisdictions that may be considering undertaking similar public 
management reforms should consider whether such an outcome would be desirable. 
 
In spite of all that, it is worth remembering that if the prime aim of the UK Government is to 
reduce expenditure, the extent to which public bodies have been able to keep within reduced 
budgets should also be the overriding focus of any audit exercise. Since the coalition has 
made it clear that its priority is to reduce the public deficit (HM Treasury 2010a; 2010b), it 
could be argued that the emphasis on financial conformance is justified.  
 
However, this narrow view restricts the ability of individual municipalities to set and pursue 
their own objectives, and from being judged on their performance in an informed and 
objective manner. In addition, cases such as the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, 
which a public inquiry found became so focused on financial conformance that patient care  
was not a priority, have highlighted the need for public bodies to ensure that they do not lose 
sight of their overriding purpose. In this example it was clear to the public (and also to 
leading politicians) that financial conformance should not take precedence over an acceptable 
level of clinical performancevii. As this article has found however, recent changes to 
transparency and accountability procedures suggest that this principle is not being applied 
within English local government. 
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i
 In times of uncertainty there may also be a prologue to these Acts in the form of an emergency budget (Ferry 
and Eckersley, 2012). 
ii
 The devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have responsibility for local 
government elsewhere in the UK. 
iii
 Note that although these changes have transformed the situation for English local government, in many other 
parts of the public sector (in particular the NHS), the level of top-down performance assessment has actually 
increased (see Talbot 2012). 
iv
 Indeed, these characterisations can also be applied to pre-1997 accountability systems at central government 
level, such as Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB), which required departments to adhere to a single 
system for planning, controlling and reporting on public spending with a view to improving public 
accountability (Likierman 1998; Heald 2005). 
v
 Government ministers may have felt that this system was justified because it ensured that citizens were able to 
access independent assessments of municipality performance. In Hood’s (2010) framework we can view this as 
accountability travelling ‘upwards’ to Parliament, before changing direction and going ‘downwards’ from 
elected representatives to citizens. 
vi
 If, as the open public services white paper suggests (Cabinet Office 2011), the Government’s intention was to 
enable private and third sector organisations to make informed bids and ultimately deliver more public services, 
then this can be seen as part of a deliberate strategy. However, if we believe ministerial pronouncements that the 
transparency agenda is primarily about empowering individual citizens (Pickles 2011), the fact that this will not 
happen bears out Wildavsky and Pressman’s (1984) analysis of the problematic nature of implementing central 
government policy at the local level.  
vii
 The House of Commons sitting in Westminster Hall discussed ‘Accountability and Transparency in the NHS’ 
as its main business on 14th March 2013, which one of the authors attended in the public gallery. The Order of 
Business notes, ‘That this House believes that... it is clear that accountability and transparency are of paramount 
importance to patient safety and trust in the NHS…’ 
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